Send email for updates
Angus C., Li J., Romero-Rodriguez E. et al.
European Journal of Public Health: 2018, 0(0), p. 1–6.
Unable to obtain a copy by clicking title? Try asking the author for a reprint by adapting this prepared e-mail or by writing to Dr Angus at firstname.lastname@example.org.
To address the ‘implementation gap’ of brief interventions in European primary care, the featured study examined the cost-effectiveness of three strategies intended to boost delivery: training and support, financial reimbursement, and the opportunity to refer patients to an online tool.
Summary Screening and brief interventions for heavy drinking are effective (1 2) and cost-effective (3) approaches to reducing alcohol-related harm. Yet delivery rates (eg, only 1 in 20 eligible patients being screened in Europe) remain low.
Current delivery of screening and brief interventions in primary care is low across Europe.
To address this ‘implementation gap’, the featured study examined the cost-effectiveness of strategies intended to boost delivery.
In England, the Netherlands and Poland, training and support, financial reimbursement, and the opportunity to refer patients to an online tool were found likely to be cost-effective strategies for increasing rates of delivery.
Using data collected in the Optimizing Delivery of Health Care Interventions (ODHIN) trial, in combination with the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model, the featured study aimed to assess the cost-effectiveness of levers to improve the delivery of screening and brief interventions, enabling policymakers to make more informed decisions when allocating potentially scarce resources.
The ODHIN trial, which took place in 120 primary care settings, equally distributed across five countries (England, the Netherlands, Poland, Catalonia and Sweden), tested the effects of three different strategies on the delivery of screening and brief interventions by primary care services:
There were eight arms to the trial in total. Primary care practices were randomly allocated to either a control group (where no support or incentives were provided to practitioners), one of the three strategies above, or to a combination of the three strategies. The control group of practices was used to estimate the results of not mounting any extra programmes to increase implementation of screening and brief intervention, providing a ‘no strategy’ or current strategy baseline against which to assess the three implementation options.
Delivery was estimated over three time pointsData was collected at three time points: baseline (ie, before the intervention); during a 12-week implementation period at which time the strategies were being implemented; and during a four-week follow-up period six months later (ie, post-intervention)., in the following ways:
• The proportion of eligible patients who were screenedA small number of patients in Catalonia were screened using an alternative screening tool, although practitioners were encouraged to use AUDIT-C wherever possible. for heavy drinking using the AUDIT-C screening questionnaire which assesses typical current drinking patterns.
• The proportion of screened patients who were identified as heavy drinkers by the screening test.
• The proportion of patients identified as heavy drinkers who subsequently received a brief intervention.
The analyses below estimate the long-term costs and effects of the trialled strategies for three out of the five countries – England, the Netherlands and Poland – over a 10-year period of investment, and presumed 30-year window of health outcomes (to account for the time lags which exist between changes in alcohol consumption and changes in the risk of alcohol-related harm).
To assess cost-effectiveness the researchers first estimated how many years of life (quality-adjusted life yearsOne quality-adjusted life year is equal to one year of life in perfect health. known as ‘QALYs’) each implementation strategy would save relative to implementing no strategy at all, a measure of the increased health gained by each strategy. Then the costs of each strategy were calculated, again relative to no strategy at all. Costs included the cost of the resultant screenings and brief intervention and healthcare costs associated with the treatment of alcohol-related health conditions; effective programmes should reduce these healthcare costs, potentially more than offsetting the cost of the programme. Dividing net extra costs by QALYs saved yielded an estimate of how much extra each strategy would cost the health service of each country per extra QALY it saved. The strategy was considered cost-effective if this figure was lower than what each country was (according to official policy) considered a cost they were prepared to pay to save a quality-adjusted year of life.
A key challenge in estimating the impact of the strategies on delivery was that, while online brief interventions and training and support are essentially ‘one-off’ policies – ie, practitioners are trained or introduced to the online tool at the outset and not subsequently re-trained – financial reimbursement requires continuous investment. The follow-up measures were therefore not directly comparable across all strategies. In order to overcome this issue, two different types of analyses were conducted: the first, providing a measure of exactly what was implemented in the trial (ie, financial reimbursement was withdrawn after 12 weeks); and the second, a measure of what would have happened if payments continued for the full 10 years.
The most effective strategy at increasing the delivery of brief interventions was training and support combined with financial reimbursement, although this had one of the highest costs for each additional brief intervention delivered across all three countries. In contrast, online brief interventions appeared to offer the cheapest way to achieve delivery of additional brief interventions, however, this was among the least effective strategies overall.
In all three countries, training and support plus financial incentives yielded the greatest health gains, and gained these at a cost below each country’s yardstick for cost-effectiveness per extra year of life in perfect health:
• England (€3,257 vs. €22,918);
• The Netherlands (€3,953 vs. €20,000);
• Poland (€8,319 vs. €14,666).
In England, relative to no new strategy both financial incentives alone and financial incentives plus training and support generated health gains while actually reducing overall costs. In the Netherlands this was also the case for financial incentives, although the estimated scale of savings was very different between the two countries (€150 million and €7.8 million respectively). Both training and support, and training and support plus financial incentives, incurred a net cost to the healthcare system in Poland, with the most effective strategy (training and support plus financial incentives) costing €6.8 million extra over 30 years compared to the control group. Estimated health gains under training and support plus financial incentives were largest in England, at 15,400 QALYs over 30 years compared to 2,400 in the Netherlands and 2,600 in Poland.
When additional analyses were performed based on the assumptions that (1) financial incentives continued to be paid for a full 10-year period, and (2) that, as observed in previous studies, the effect of these on provider behaviour was maintained in the long term, the results were broadly similar. Training and support plus financial incentives was still the optimal strategy in England and Poland, but it was no longer cost-effective in the Netherlands compared to training and support alone. As in the previous analyses, the optimal strategies were estimated to be cost-saving in England and the Netherlands, but not Poland, and the health gains in England were significantly larger than in the other countries.
Based on assumptions that training had to be re-delivered every five or every two years in order to achieve any persistence of effect of other strategies, there were significant increases in the costs associated with anything involving training and support. For example, the cost over 10 years of delivering training and support in the Netherlands increased from €8.6 million to €15.9 million with re-training every five years, and €36.9 million with re-training every two years. However, these increased costs made little difference to the overall cost-effectiveness results and the overall conclusions of the analysis. The only significant change was that training and support ceased to be cost-effective in the Netherlands if re-training was required every two years, with referral to online brief interventions becoming the most cost-effective option under this scenario.
When the researchers assumed that the effect of brief interventions on alcohol consumption persisted for less time (three years), the overall cost-effectiveness was reduced for all strategies. While training and support plus financial incentives remained the most cost-effective option for both England and the Netherlands (€21,668 and €13,413 respectively per extra QALY gained), it was no longer cost-effective in Poland, with training and support alone offering the most cost-effective strategy at €2,609.
While delivery rates of screening and brief interventions in European primary care are currently low, several cost-effective strategies exist to increase these rates.
Training and support combined with financial incentives may offer the most cost-effective strategy for increasing delivery, and subsequently reducing alcohol-related harm and associated costs to society. However, this finding is sensitive to both the characteristics of the country and assumptions around the long-term effects of brief interventions. Furthermore, policymakers may need to be mindful of the potential ethical issues (1 2) associated with offering financial incentives to healthcare practitioners.
commentary The level of alcohol consumption in Europe is high compared with the rest of the world, and although there is evidence that screening and brief interventions in primary healthcare may offer “a cost-effective policy option for tackling alcohol-related harms, at least in high-income countries”, their level of implementation in routine primary healthcare remains low. The featured study was part of a package of work seeking to address this problem – assessing the cost-effectiveness of levers to improve delivery. However, before discussing the ‘implementation gap’ raised in this study, and how brief interventions can be delivered “widely and well enough” to improve health across the entire population, it is necessary to examine the underlying assumption that brief interventions are effective in real-world settings – arguably the ‘Achilles heel’ of the findings.
One of the key documents forming the basis of this claim in the featured paper is a 2007 review conducted under the rigorous procedures specified by the Cochrane Collaboration. This review was subsequently updated in 2018 and reported moderate-quality evidence that brief interventions delivered in general practice and emergency care settings can reduce alcohol consumption in hazardous and harmful drinkers. When the constituent studies were examined in the Effectiveness Bank (skip to commentary), what was judged to be the most real-world trial in 2007 and 2018 remained unchanged. In this nurse-led brief intervention only a quarter of the practices approached were recruited and just over 1 in 10 contributed data to the analysis, suggesting that the results may not be reflective of what would happen in a practice less motivated or less well placed to get involved in, and complete, a brief intervention trial. This raised questions over whether the average drinking reduction seen in the trials would be replicated if the interventions were ‘scaled up’ to practices in general, and applied by the general run of practitioners to the general run of patients.
A simulation study from 2013 calculated the healthcare cost savings and benefits for patients in England of screening and brief advice, the findings of which made it look an ‘unmissable bargain’. However, as with the featured study, this was contingent on the assumption that interventions would be routinely implemented, and that the desired effects would transfer from tightly controlled research studies to the kind of implementation envisaged in routine practice.
Studies reviewed in the Effectiveness Bank indicate that without material or reputational and possibly career-affecting sanctions/incentives, implementation drives based on educating, persuading and supporting practitioners have reached just a minority of the intended patients. Strong sanctions and incentives can generate the desired activity, but may be costly and tempt services and practitioners to short-change quality and ‘game’ the system.
In the ODHIN trial, one of the options tried in 2013 was supplementing basic information for GPs on national safer drinking recommendations as well as a request to screen all adult patients, with per-patient payments for alcohol screening and advice. In England these payments were €6 per screening and €25 per patient advised, up to a ceiling of €2,200 per practice. Relative to basic information, across the five nationsEngland, the Netherlands, Poland, Catalonia and Sweden. payments significantly doubled the screening rate, feeding through to a non-significant doubling in the proportion of patients seen at the practices who were offered advice on their drinking. But still just 1 in 8 attendees were screened leading to about 2% being advised.
When the analysis assessed whether among all the combinations of intervention-promoters, certain elements seemed to make a difference, payments emerged as the most important component, one which allied with training and support nearly quadrupled the screening rate leading to a near-significant 2.3 times greater proportion of patients being advised. However, even this combination would across the entire sample have raised the proportion of risky drinkers who received advice from an estimated 3% before to only about 9%Before the programmes 11 out of 1000 patients were advised while 330 scored as risky drinkers on a screening test = 3.33% of risky drinkers advised. With training/support and financial incentives, the advice rate among those practices rose from 12.5 per 1000 patients to 34.6. Extrapolated to the whole sample, this would have had the effect of raising the advice rate to about 34.6/12.5 x 3.33, equating to 9.2%. afterwards. Without knowing if there were any impacts on the patients, the most the researchers could say was that jurisdictions “could consider” promoting brief alcohol advice in primary care through training and guidance, financial and performance management arrangements, and strategic leadership.
A qualitative evaluation of the ODHIN trial provides more insight into the “factors and mechanisms of why, how, for whom and under what circumstances implementation strategies work or do not work” in increasing screening and brief interventions. Interviews were conducted with 40 GPs and 28 nurses in Catalonia, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden – among whom just over half had high screening performance, and the remainder, low screening performance. Essential ingredients for implementation seemed to be gaining the knowledge and skills, team-based training, and learning to prioritise screening and brief interventions during high workloads. Most of the professionals allocated to training and support perceived the guidelines to be feasible and compatible with their daily practice.
The authors of the featured study made reference to the ethical questions surrounding financial incentives to healthcare practitioners. In the British Journal of General Practice, Dr Graham Kramer expressed the following about the implications of rewarding practices for the delivery of high quality care (in this case under the Quality and Outcomes Framework):
“I had worried that, by being paid to implement evidence-based guidelines, my work would become a restricted, target-driven exercise that shifted the balance of my consultations to a doctor and disease-centred agenda. I had been concerned that this created conflicts of interest and how that might undermine, not only trust by my patients in me as a doctor, but also the trustworthiness of the profession. I worried that in some domains I was taking money to engage in work that I felt had limited value for my patients, money that could possibly be spent in more useful areas. Was I colluding in a wholesale folly of medical practice and worse still, why wasn’t I doing anything about it? Had my mouth been effectively ‘stuffed with gold’?”
The alcohol treatment matrix in the Effectiveness Bank (see cell E1) discusses this issue of incentives, including whether financial incentives indeed divert clinical practice in the desired direction, or risk confirming to staff that alcohol screening and brief interventions are not their core business.
Last revised 31 January 2019. First uploaded 09 January 2019
Give us your feedback on the site (two-minute survey)
Open Effectiveness Bank home page
Add your name to the mailing list to be alerted to new studies and other site updates